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Supermax’s Kryptonite? Wilkinson v. Austin: 
The Due Process Challenge to Ohio’s 
Super-Maximum Security Prison 
 
ADAM MILLER 
 
I.        INTRODUCTION 
 
 
he most dangerous criminals in the United States are 
housed across the nation in highly restrictive and extremely 
isolated super-maximum security prisons known as Supermax 
prisons.1 Society’s most notorious and feared villains 
including Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), Terry 
Nichols (conspirator in the Oklahoma City bombing), Lee 
Boyd Malvo (conspirator in the 2002 Beltway sniper attacks), 
John Allen Muhammed (implementer of the Beltway sniper 
attacks), and Eric Robert Rudolph (implementer of the 1996 
Centennial Olympic Park bombing) are all imprisoned 
indefinitely in a Supermax prison.2  The recent increase in 
prison population and difficulty in preventing prison violence 
has resulted in the widespread use of Supermax facilities.3 
                                                 
1 See generally Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and 
General Considerations, U.S.Dept. of Justice, National Institute of 
Corrections, Jan. 1999, available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/ 
1999/014937.pdf (explicating Supermax prisons remove prisoners who 
are assaultive or violent, attempting to escape, preying on other inmates, 
or exhibiting disruptive behavior from general population). 
2 See generally Supermax Prisons and the Constitution: Liability 
Concerns in the Extended Control Unit, National Institute of Corrections, 
Nov. 2004; See also, Wikipedia, Supermax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Supermax_prison (noting Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), Terry 
Nichols (conspirator in the Oklahoma City bombing), Lee Boyd Malvo 
(conspirator in the 2002 Beltway sniper attacks), John Allen Muhammed 
(implementer of the Beltway sniper attacks), and Eric Robert Rudolph 
(implementer of 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing) are imprisoned 
in Supermax prison). 
3  See Charles A. Pettigrew, Technology and the Eighth Amendment: 
The Problem of Supermax Prisons, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 191, 191-92 
(2002) (noting that the United States, one of the world’s largest 
incarcerators, leads in development of state of the art, Supermax prisons, 
T 
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The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports, at the end of 
2003, 6.9 million people were under correctional supervision 
in the United States, almost a three hundred percent increase 
since 1980.4  The dramatic increase in correctional 
populations has resulted in widespread prison crowding, 
forcing most correctional facilities to operate above their 
designed capacity.5  The overcrowding of prisons, the 
“toughening” of the inmate population, and the increase in 
gang activity have made it difficult for corrections 
administrators to maintain order.6  In response to the 
                                                                                                     
with one figure putting the number of Supermax prisoners between 
25,000 and 100,000).   
4 See U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003, 
Correctional Populations Chart, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (showing three hundred percent increase in 
correctional supervision from 1,842,100 persons under correction 
supervision in 1980 to 6,924,500 persons in 2003); See, e.g., Prison 
Reform Advocacy Center, Critical Facts about the Nations Prisons, 
http://www.prisonreform.com/usprison_main.shtml (“the three strikes 
laws—mandating that any person convicted of three felonies must be 
sentenced to life without parole, proposes to end or severely limit parole, 
escalation of the war on drugs, mandatory minimum sentencing for non-
violent crimes, and increased federalization of certain categories of 
crimes” all contributed to the dramatic growth in prison population. Id.); 
See also Riveland, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting that National Institute of 
Corrections attributes increased prison crowding partly to “increase in 
street gang members, drug offenders, mentally ill, and youthful offenders” 
Id.). 
5 See Correctional Populations Chart, supra note 4 (indicating increase 
of over 5 million people under correctional supervision from 1980 to 
2003).  Prison crowding has forced correctional administrators to house 
and manage far more offenders than their facilities are designed to hold 
with fewer staff than needed to manage the institutions safely and 
humanely.  Crowding creates severe management problems for state and 
local officials.  See also Policy: Options for Addressing Prison Crowding, 
National Criminal Justice Association, (July 22, 2003) (detailing how 
prison populations have reached historic high levels).  
6 See Riveland, supra note 1, at 7 (reporting use of such facilities 
allows for the correctional use of “dispersion” to handle troublesome 
inmates) (Corrections officials have defended the need for such facilities 
based on the perceived toughening of the inmate population, increased 
gang activity, the difficulty of maintaining order in severely crowded 
prisons, and from experience gained over time that suggests such units are 
beneficial.).  
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increasing difficulties to maintain inmate control, 
jurisdictions throughout the nation have built Supermax 
facilities as highly restrictive and state of the art security 
prisons.7   
Due to the harsh and restrictive conditions within 
Supermax prisons, various questions have been raised 
regarding the constitutionality of the facilities.8  Wilkinson v. 
                                                 
7  In recent years, prison administrators have placed persons exhibiting 
disruptive behaviors into separate housing units.  This “concentration” 
approach creates specific units or facilities to manage this troublesome 
type of inmate in a high-security environment, generally isolated from all 
other inmates.  The premise is that general population prisons will be 
more easily and safely managed if the troublemakers are completely 
removed.  See id. at 1. (explicating that this approach allows for dispersal 
of problem inmates and prevents them from uniting in their misconduct 
by enabled prison officials to break up cliques and gangs); see also 
Human Rights Watch, Supermax Prisons: An Overview, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/supermax/Sprmx002.htm#P40391 
(claiming exploding prison populations, meager budgets, and punitive 
political climates have overwhelmed corrections professional’s ability to 
operate safe, secure, and humane facilities resulting in administrator’s use 
of prolonged supermax confinement in effort to increase their control over 
prisoners). 
8  See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(The District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed 
allegations that California’s Pelican Bay State Prison’s Security Housing 
Unit [SHU], a Supermax facility, “imposed inhumane conditions” on its 
mentally ill inmates.  The court determined that the conditions within the 
Supermax prison created a level of cruelty that violated the mentally ill 
inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.  The Court found the conditions of 
confinement in SHU resulted in severe isolation of inmates which 
inflicted serious mental injury to inmates.  Not all inmates in the SHU 
were found to be sufficiently at risk of developing serious mental health 
problems as a result of their confinement.  Those inmates who 
demonstrated a “particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe 
injury to their mental health” id., were removed from incarceration in the 
SHU.); See also Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 
2001) (The Court held that the extreme isolation and solitary nature of 
Supermax prisons inflicts unconstitutional hardship on mentally ill 
inmates.  The court determined that there was sufficient evidence to find 
that both the objective and subjective components of the Eighth 
Amendment’s analysis were met, granting an injunction prohibiting 
mentally ill inmates from being housed in Wisconsin’s Supermax 
facility.). 
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Austin is the most recent constitutional challenge of 
Supermax prisons to reach the United States Supreme Court.9  
In Wilkinson, the Court reviewed allegations that the inmate 
selection process for the Ohio State Penitentiary [hereinafter 
“OSP”], a Supermax facility, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.10  The Court unanimously 
held that, although inmates of OSP have a protected liberty 
interest in avoiding assignment to the facility, the procedures 
set forth in Ohio’s new policy dictating the inmate selection 
process satisfied the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.11 
This note discusses the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Wilkinson that OSP’s system for inmate placement in its 
Supermax facility does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.12  Part II will summarize OSP’s purpose and 
condition, and will focus on Ohio’s New Policy regarding 
inmate placement.13  Part III will examine Supreme Court 
precedent and the Court’s conclusions of law in determining 
whether inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding 
assignment to OSP and the due process implications of the 
inmate selection process to OSP.14  Part IV will question the 
Supreme Court’s disregard of the adverse mental effects in 
inmates subjected to the extreme isolation conditions within 
Supermax prisons.15  Finally, Part V will analyze the likely 
impact of the Wilkinson decision on other jurisdictions in 
their development of fair inmate placement procedures for 
their Supermax facilities.16 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See infra notes 88-96, 100-104, 107-120 and accompanying text 
(discussing Wilkinson v. Austin Supreme Court decision).  
10  Id. 
11  Id.  
12  Id.  
13  See infra notes 18-68 and accompanying text.  
14  See infra notes 96-127 and accompanying text.   
15  See infra notes 67-123 and accompanying text. 
16  See infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text. 
2007 Supermax Kryptonite  227 
 
  
II.        OHIO STATE PENITENTIARY: A SUPERMAX 
FACILITY 
 
As a result of a 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio 
Correctional Facility, Ohio’s first and only supermax prison 
was opened in Youngstown in April of 1998.17  OSP has the 
capability of housing 504 male inmates in single occupancy 
cells and is designed to separate the “most predatory and 
dangerous prisoners” from the rest of Ohio’s general prisoner 
population.18  The following section serves as background for 
the overall purpose of supermax prisons as well as the 
placement procedures and environmental conditions of OSP 
specifically.19 
 
A. Purpose of Supermax Prisons 
 
Supermax facilities are intended to house and control the 
“worst of the worst.”20  These facilities are maximum-
                                                 
17 See Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, OSP 
Inspection Report, Jan. 29, 2004, http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/ 
reports/osp.pdf [hereinafter OSP Inspection Report] (detailing that OSP, a 
$65 million project, was reported to have been a “vision” in response to 
the Lucasville riot); See also Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction, The Institutions, http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/prisprog.htm 
(outlining OSP’s annual operating budget of $28,595,868). 
18  See Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Institution 
Information: Ohio State Penitentiary, http://www.drc.state/oh.us/ 
Public/osp.htm (describing OSP’s facility mission is “to protect Ohio’s 
citizens, employees, and inmates by confining those inmates who pose a 
threat to staff, other inmates, or institutional security in a controlled 
setting that is conducive to self-improvement” Id.).  See id. (graphical 
display of OSP’s population, racial distribution and institutional 
information, detailing 454 inmates were incarcerated in OSP as of 
September 2005).   
19  See infra notes 20-70 and accompanying text. 
20  See Supermax prisons and the Constitution, supra note 2 (claiming 
Supermax prisons are designed to controlling the most dangerous, 
recalcitrant, aggressive, and antagonistic inmates in a prison); See e.g. 
Wikipedia, Supermax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermax_prison 
(claiming notable inmates currently incarcerated in Supermax facilities 
include: Terry Nichols, Theodore Kaczynski, Lee Boyd Malvo, John 
Allen Muhammed, and Eric Robert Rudolph.).   
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security prisons with highly restrictive conditions designed to 
segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general 
prison population.21  The National Institute of Corrections 
defines Supermax prisons as correctional facilities “that 
provide for the management and secure control of inmates 
who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or 
seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated.”22  The 
inmates in OSP are a “threat to safety and security in 
traditional high-security facilities and their behavior can only 
be controlled by separation, restrictive movement, and 
limited access to staff and other inmates.”23  The use of 
Supermax facilities has increased over the last twenty years, 
in response to the rise in the amount of prison gangs and 
prison violence.24  By isolating the penitentiary system’s 
most violent prisoners, supermax prisons are intended to 
ensure the safety of the guards and other prisoners and to 
produce “behavioral modification” within the inmates.25  
                                                 
21  See Pettigrew, supra note 3, at 193 (describing Supermax prisons 
as “highly restrictive, high-custody housing unit within a secure facility, 
or an entire secure facility, that isolates inmates from the general prison 
population and from each other due to grievous crimes, repetitive 
assaultive or violent institutional behavior, the threat of escape or actual 
escape from high-custody facility(s), or inciting or threatening to incite 
disturbances in a correctional institution” Id.) 
22  Riveland, supra note 1, at 3.  Prisons have historically had “jails 
within prisons.”  Simply because people are in the controlled environment 
of a prison does not stop some of them from being assaultive or violent, 
attempting to escape, inciting disturbances, preying on weaker inmates, or 
otherwise exhibiting disruptive behavior. Such people must be removed 
from the general population of the prison environment while they threaten 
any of those behaviors.  See id. at 7 (explicating that order and safety are 
priority objectives of any correctional facility).  
23  See id. at 9. 
24  See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2389 (2005) (citing 
Riveland, supra note 1, at 5) (claiming that most prisons across the 
country have been operating at well over 100% of design capacity due to 
increases in street gang members, drug offenders, mentally ill, and 
youthful offenders). 
 25  See Jerry R. DeMaio, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat 
of Overclassifcation in Wisconsin’s Supermax Prisons, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
207, 208 (2001) (claiming that the “purpose of a Supermax prison is 
twofold: to help maintain order within the prison population as a whole 
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Approximately thirty states now have supermax facilities in 
operation.26 
 
B. Placement Into OSP 
 
When OSP opened, the procedures used to assign inmates 
to the facility were inconsistent and undefined.27  For a time, 
no official policy governing placement existed and inmates 
were placed in the OSP based solely on warden 
recommendations.28  In an attempt to establish consistent 
guidelines for the selection and placement of inmates into 
                                                                                                     
and to ensure the safety of inmates and staff” Id.); See also Alice Lynd, 
What is a “Supermax” Prison?, The Spunk Press Archive, March 1996, 
http://www.spunk.org/library/prison/sp001611.txt (explicating that 
supermaxes are designed to house violent prisoners or prisoners who 
might threaten security of the guards or other prisoners).  
 26  See Leena Kurki and Norval Morris, The Purpose, Practices, and 
Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 387 (2001); See 
also Joan Biskupic, High Court Upholds Ohio’s ‘Supermax’ Prison 
Policy, USA TODAY (June 13, 2005) (finding that approximately 30 states 
run highly restrictive “Supermax” facilities, and the federal government 
operates two).  
 27  See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2386 (determining that when OSP 
first became operational, no official policy governing placement there was 
in effect resulting in inconsistent and undefined procedures and haphazard 
and erroneous placements); See also OSP Inspection Report, supra note 
17 (explicating that OSP placement decisions were alleged to be arbitrary 
and inconsistent, with near total discretion afforded to decision-makers 
but the “department has since refined and improved upon policies and 
practices to ensure due process, and to ensure that each level 5 placement 
is necessary and appropriate” and finding that “haphazard placements 
were not uncommon, and some individuals who did not pose high-
security risks were designated, nonetheless, for OSP.” Id.).  
28 Under the Old Policy, 111-07, the classification committee made 
up of a deputy warden and a mental health professional from the inmate's 
current institution, and a third official designated by the warden, would 
receive a written statement from the prisoner as well as information 
provided by staff, and make a recommendation to the warden.  The 
warden then approved or disapproved the recommendation, and sent the 
information along to the Bureau of Classification.  Even if both the 
classification committee and the warden agreed that high-maximum-
security classification was inappropriate for an inmate, the Chief of the 
Bureau could still assign the inmate to OSP.  See Austin v. Wilkinson, 
372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Austin II].  
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OSP, Ohio issued Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Corrections [hereinafter “ODRC”] Policy 111-07.29  This 
policy has been revised and now contains two relevant 
versions: the “Old Policy” and the “New Policy.”30  The 
problems with inmate placement that persisted under the Old 
Policy were corrected in the New Policy by providing more 
guidance on OSP inmate selection and affording inmates 
more procedural safeguards against erroneous and 
undeserved OSP placement.31 
Upon entering the correctional system, all Ohio inmates 
are assigned a numerical security classification ranging from 
level 1 through level 5, with 1 being the lowest security risk 
and 5 the highest.32  This initial risk classification is based on 
various factors including the nature of the underlying offense, 
criminal history, and gang affiliation.33  The inmates sent to 
                                                 
29  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy 111-07 (Aug. 31, 1998)).   
30  See id. (indicating that the Old Policy took effect on January 28, 
1999, but problems with the Old Policy lead to the creation of the New 
Policy which took effect in early 2002). 
31 See id. (declaring that the New Policy was promulgated after 
forming a committee to study the matter and retaining a national expert in 
prison security, resulting in the a policy that provided more guidance on 
the factors to be considered in placement decisions and afforded inmates 
more procedural protection against erroneous placement at OSP). 
32 See Austin II, 372 F.3d at 350 (citing Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy 53-CLS-01 § V and Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy 111-07 § VI(B)–(D), 
App. 125a–131a) (explicating that all prisoners in Ohio are assigned a 
rating from Level 1 [lowest risk] to Level 5 [highest risk] based on a 
predictive assessment of the likely security risk the prisoner presents 
“based on a variety of characteristics about the prisoner’s offense, any 
previous criminal conduct, his gang affiliation, etc” Id.); See also 
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (noting Level 5 inmates are placed in the 
OSP and levels 1 through 4 inmates are placed at lower security facilities 
throughout the State). 
33  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (finding that a classification for 
review for OSP placement can occur either (1) upon entry into the prison 
system if the inmate was convicted of certain offenses or (2) during the 
term of incarceration if an inmate engages in specified conduct); See also 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (No. 04-495) available at http://docket.medill.northwestern. 
edu/archives/002123.php (explaining that pursuant to ODRC Policy 111-
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OSP are those who fall into Classification Level 5, which is a 
“security level for inmates who commit or lead others to 
commit violent, disruptive, predatory, riotous actions, or who 
otherwise pose a serious threat to the security of the 
institution as set forth in the established Level 5 criteria.”34  
This classification is subject to modification at any time 
during the inmate's prison term if the inmate engages in any 
misconduct that is deemed a security risk.35     
                                                                                                     
07, the procedure for classifying inmates as Level 5 is triggered by: (1) an 
independent finding that the inmate has committed a serious violation of 
prison rules, or (2) the inmate’s conviction for a new crime committed 
while in prison). 
34 See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction 53-CLS-04; See also OSP Inspection 
Report, supra note 17 (outlining Level 5 placement criteria) (The criteria 
governing Level 5 placement considers:  
(1) Whether the inmate has demonstrated physically or 
sexually assaultive and/or predatory behavior resulting in 
either serious physical injury or death to any person…; (2) 
the nature of the criminal offense committed prior to 
incarceration constitutes a current threat…;  (3) the inmate 
has lead, organized, or incited a serious disturbance or riot 
that resulted in the taking of a hostage, significant property 
damage, physical harm, or loss of life; (4) the inmate has 
conspired or attempted to convey, introduce or possess 
major contraband which poses a serious threat or danger to 
the security of the institution…; (5) the inmate functions as a 
leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group, 
which is actively involved in violent or disruptive behavior; 
(6) the inmate escaped, attempted to escape or committed 
acts to facilitate an escape from a level three or four or 
equivalent close or maximum security facility…; (7) the 
inmate has demonstrated an ability to compromise the 
integrity of staff, which resulted in a threat to the security of 
the institution; (8) the inmate knowingly exposed others to 
the risk of contracting a dangerous disease, such as HIV or 
hepatitis; and (9) the inmate, through repetitive and/or 
seriously disruptive behavior, has demonstrated a chronic 
inability to adjust to level 4B as evidenced by repeated class 
II rule violations. Id.   
35  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 
346 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-495) available at 
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/002123.php (defining how 
although prisoners receive initial classification upon incarceration, that 
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On an unannounced inspection of OSP in January 2004, 
the placement of inmates, according to the offenses they were 
convicted of, classified as level 5 were reported as follows: 
 
 
Table 1.136  
Reasons for Level 5 Placement Percent 
Serious Assault of an Inmate 29% 
Serious Assault of an Employee 26% 
Murder of an Inmate  23% 
Murder of Employee  8% 
Hostage/Kidnapping of Employee 7% 
Rape of an Inmate  3% 
Serious Escape related Offense  1% 
Conspiracy to Murder Inmate  1% 
Pre-Incarceration Offenses 1% 
 
The New Policy provides inmates with more procedural 
safeguards against erroneous and undeserved OSP placement 
through the ODRC inmate review process.37  This protection 
is initiated by a “Security Designation Long Form” 
[hereinafter “Long Form”], which details the inmate's recent 
violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying 
offense, and other pertinent details.38  The New Policy 
provides inmates with forty-eight hours notice of their 
                                                                                                     
classification is subject to change at any point during prisoner’s term, 
based on prison conduct). 
36  See OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17. 
37  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (declaring New Policy provides 
more guidance on factors to be considered in placement decisions and 
afforded inmates more procedural protection against erroneous placement 
at OSP). 
38 Id. (explicating review process begins when prison officials 
prepare “Security Designation Long Form,” three-page form detailing 
inmate recent violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying 
offense, and other pertinent details). 
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hearing, where a three-member committee will review the 
inmate's proposed security classification level.39  Inmates are 
provided with their Long Form in advance.  They are then 
permitted to attend the hearing and may submit a written 
statement or offer any pertinent information, explanation, 
and/or objection to their OSP placement.40 
The committee must recommend placement and the 
inmate’s current warden must approve the placement, for an 
inmate to be placed in OSP.41  The inmate has fifteen days to 
file an objection to their placement with the Bureau of 
Classification, a body of Ohio prison officials vested with the 
final decision making authority over all Ohio inmate 
assignments.42  If any of these three administrative bodies 
finds placement at the OSP inappropriate the process 
terminates.43 If the Bureau approves the warden’s 
recommendation, however, the inmate is transferred to 
                                                 
39 Id. (describing how three-member classification committee 
convenes to review proposed classification and to hold hearings after 
inmate receives at least forty-eight hours written notice of hearing, 
summarizing the conduct or offense triggering placement review). 
40  Id. (noting that inmates may not call witnesses); See also Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(No. 04-495) available at http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu 
/archives/002123.php, (citing Policy 111-07 § VI(C), App.127a–130a; 
Notice of Hearing Form, App. 144a (explaining that inmates are permitted 
to make written and oral submissions at hearing)).  
41  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Policy 111-07 § VI(C), 
App. 127–130a; Classification Committee Report Form, App. 144a 
(requiring that if Committee does recommend OSP placement, it 
documents decision on a “Classification Committee Report” setting forth 
“the nature of the threat the inmate presents and the committee's reasons 
for the recommendation,” as well as summary of any information 
presented at hearing. Id.)). 
42 See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2391 (citing Policy 111-07 § VI(C), 
App. 127a–130a (detailing that if Warden approves placement 
recommendation, Warden forwards it to ODRC’s Bureau of Classification 
for final approval but inmate has 15 days to file any objections with 
Bureau of Classification)). 
43 See id. at 2390 (finding if any one reviewer declines to recommend 
OSP placement, process terminates). 
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OSP.44  Inmates assigned to OSP receive another review 
within the thirty days prior to their arrival.45  Designated OSP 
staff members review the inmate’s file to determine if the 
inmate's placement was appropriate.46  If the review board 
finds the placement proper, then the inmate remains in OSP.47   
After initial placement at OSP, the classification 
committee notifies the inmates, at least twice a year, to 
inform them of their progress toward security level 
reduction.48  The committee must advise the inmate of any 
specific conduct necessary for Level 5 classification 
reduction, as well as the committee’s estimate of the amount 
of time before the inmate’s security level is likely to be 
reduced.49  The classification committee evaluates several 
factors in accordance with ODRC policy 53-CLS-04, to 
determine if an inmate’s reduction from Level 5 security 
classification is appropriate.50 
                                                 
44 Id. at 2391 (explaining that if the Bureau of Classification deems 
inmate is properly placed, inmate remains in OSP). 
45 See id. (detailing how inmates assigned to OSP receive placement 
review within 30 days of their arrival).  
46 Id. (explaining that designated OSP staff member examine inmate 
files to determine if placement was appropriate). 
47 See id. (showing that If OSP staff member deems inmate is 
inappropriately placed, the reviewer prepares written recommendation to 
OSP warden that inmate be transferred to lower security institution). 
48  See id. (citing ODRC Policy 53-CLS-04, mandating that “inmates 
classified into Level 5B shall have an assessment completed every three 
months; inmates classified as Level 5A shall have an assessment every six 
months.” Id.). 
49  The annual review focuses on a variety of factors that are 
designed to allow a predictive assessment of the risk the prisoner presents 
including: “the prisoner’s underlying criminal offense, the time left on his 
sentence, the reasons for his Supermax placement, the time that has 
elapsed since the incident prompting placement, his conduct at OSP, the 
extent to which he has taken advantage of programming and his 
interaction with staff.”  Petition for Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 
F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-495), available at 
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/002123.php (citing Policy 
111-07 § VI(F), (H) & (I); Privilege/Security Level Review Form, App. 
144a.). 
50  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2391 (citing ODRC Policy 53-CLS-
04); See also OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17 (detailing 
classification committee considerations in determining security 
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C. Conditions at OSP 
 
Supermax prisons are designed to exercise complete 
control over inmates through social isolation and restricting 
mobility.51  OSP inmates are subject to more restrictions than 
prisoners at other Ohio correctional facilities, including those 
in maximum-security prisons.52  OSP detains inmates in their 
                                                                                                     
classification level reduction) In considering the reduction in security 
classification level, the classification committee will consider:  
Reason for placement in Level 4 or 5 and relevant 
circumstances; Conduct Reports; Current Privilege Level; Time 
Served in current privilege level; Total time spent in Level 5 
and/or Level 4; Time left to spend on current sentence; Time 
since last incident that resulted in inmate being designated Level 
5 or 4; Program Involvement; Behavior in last five years; 
including prior to Level 4 or 5 classification; Security level prior 
to placement; Adjustment/behavior after placement; Factors 
which indicate a risk of future violence; Interaction with others 
(staff and/or inmates); Recognition and acknowledgement of the 
factors contributing  to the commission of the placement offense 
and nature; The findings and recommendations of the previous 
assessment committees; Previous review committees; and the 
findings and recommendations of all assessment committees 
subsequent to the placement in Level 4 or 5. Id. at 10-11  
51 See MacArthur Justice Center, Supermax Prisons, 
http://macarthur.uchicago.edu/supermax/index.html (finding that 
Supermax prisons exercise control over inmates through extreme social 
isolation, severely restricting movement, and environments restricting 
stimulation); For a graphical display of the privileges and restrictions on 
OSP inmates, see OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13 (outlining 
privileges and restrictions of Level 5 inmates in areas of telephone use, 
recreation amounts and facilities, visitation, attorney visits, clergy visits, 
library visits, reading materials, meals, hygiene, media and education 
programs). 
52   See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2388 (claiming OSP conditions are 
more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in Ohio, including 
conditions on its death row or in its administrative control units); See also 
OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13 (comparing privileges of 
OSP inmates and non-OSP inmates in areas of telephone use, recreation 
amounts and facilities, visitation, attorney visits, clergy visits, library 
visits, reading materials, meals, hygiene, media and education programs). 
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cells for twenty-three hours a day.53  These single occupancy 
cells measure roughly 89.7 square feet and are sealed with a 
solid metal door.54  The door contains a small, thick glass 
window and a food slot through which all meals are served.55 
OSP cells are designed to be highly restrictive, with 
minimal amenities and personal items available.56  Each cell 
has a “narrow outside window that cannot be opened [and is 
smaller than] the square footage standard established by the 
American Correctional Association.”57  Inmates have no 
control over the temperature of the cells or the circulation of 
air through the cell.58  Each cell is scarcely furnished with a 
                                                 
53  See Rachel Kamel and Bonnie Kerness, The Prison Inside the 
Prison: Control Units, Supermax Prisons and Devices of Torture, 2 
(2003) (explaining that prisoners are confined for twenty-three or twenty-
four hours a day, often in what they describe as an “eerie silence”); See 
also Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee: Inspection Report, 
Nov. 20, 1999, available at http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/publications/osp_ 
page.html (detailing that inmates are locked in their solid door-front cells 
23 hours each day). 
54  See Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, supra note 
53 (explicating that inmates are locked in their solid door-front cells 23 
hours each day). 
55  See Kamel, supra note 53, at 2 (detailing how food trays arrive in 
small slots in the door to further OSP design for inmates to rarely leave 
their cells); See also Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, 
supra note 53 (describing each cell as having a solid-front cell door has 
one small, thick glass window and key controlled “food slot” hatch). 
 56  OSP inmates have no contact visits:  prisoners sit behind a 
plexiglass window, phone calls and visitation privileges are strictly 
limited, books and magazines may be denied and pens restricted, TV and 
radios may be prohibited or, if allowed, are controlled by guards.  
Prisoners have little or no personal privacy: guards monitor the inmates' 
movements by video cameras, communication between prisoners and 
control booth officers is mostly through speakers and microphones, an 
officer at a control center may be able to monitor cells and corridors and 
control all doors electronically.  Lynd, supra note 25 (detailing limited 
interaction and restricted OSP environment).  
57 See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 724 (N.D. Ohio 
2002) [hereinafter Austin I] (overturned as to due process analysis but not 
as to description of OSP; finding that cell small windows do not comply 
with square footage standard established by American Correctional 
Association). 
58  Id. 
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“sink, toilet, small desk, and an immovable stool.”59  Inmates 
sleep on a “narrow concrete slab with a thin mattress.”60  The 
department strictly limits the amount of personal property 
allowed to an inmate.61  Additionally, a light remains on in 
the cell at all times.62  Although the light can be dimmed, an 
inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to 
further discipline.63 
OSP inmates are allowed to leave their cell one hour a 
day to access a two room recreational area.64  After reviewing 
the recreation rooms at OSP, the American Correctional 
Association found the facility did not meet the ceiling height 
standard and “did not comply with its standards for outdoor 
recreation.”65  The solitary recreation policy for all inmates 
has recently been changed to allow a limited number of 
inmates to have recreation with one other prisoner.66 
                                                 
59  Id.  
60  Id. 
61 Id. (finding OSP has extra limitations on personal property rights); 
See also Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, OSP Inspection 
Report, at 13 (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.ciic.state.oh. us/reports/osp.pdf 
(outlining privileges and personal property restrictions on OSP inmates). 
62  Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 724 (explicating that cell light remains 
on at all times, although light can be dimmed); See also Kamel, supra 
note 53 at 4 (describing that when prisoners are confined in their cells 
they are subjected to either an “eerie silence” or constant unpleasant 
noise, or by “having lights on twenty-four hours per day.”). 
63 Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 724 (explaining how inmates who 
attempt to shield cell’s light on 24 hour per day before sleeping is subject 
to further discipline). 
64 See Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, supra note 53 
(detailing how inmates are given one hour of recreation per day at least 
five times per week and that inmate movement to recreation area is 
conducted by escort of at least two Correctional Officers while inmate is 
in full restraints); See also Everett Hoffman, Background on Super 
Maximum Security (Supermax) Isolation Units, THE ADVOCATE: 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY, (Jan. 1999) (detailing 
that inmates are allowed one hour of solitary recreation in a concrete 
enclosure, but their movements are monitored by video cameras and they 
are required to be visually searched by standing naked before control 
booth window).  
65  See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 724. 
66  Id.  
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Inmate interaction at OSP is strictly limited.67 OSP 
inmates eat alone, exercise alone, and are not allowed to 
share books, magazines or other personal property.68 Until the 
recent introduction of group counseling sessions, inmates 
were not permitted to communicate with others.69 The “group 
counseling sessions are conducted by placing inmates in 
adjacent bar-fronted cells so that each inmate can see the 
counselor and hear the other inmates.”70 
 
III.       THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE IN WILKINSON 
 
In Wilkinson, a class of current and former OSP inmates 
filed suit for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that Ohio’s policy for selecting inmates for incarceration in 
OSP violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.71  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
                                                 
67  For a further description of the limited interaction and restrictive 
conditions, see Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, supra 
note 53. 
68 See generally OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13  
(outlining privileges and personal property restrictions on OSP inmates); 
See generally Kamel, supra note 53.  
69  See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 725;The program booths observed 
in the inspection provide the inmates with the opportunity for out of cell 
programming and interaction with staff and inmates that otherwise would 
not be possible.  Programming and counseling is offered in education, 
substance abuse, religion, personal and emotional health, and community 
service.  OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13 (explicating that 
OSP was not designed to accommodate out of cell programming so 
potential programming space is extremely limited). 
70  See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 725 n.7 (citing expert testimony 
that there was no communication between inmates as “inmates were 
almost always being brought out in isolation” and there was no contact 
with other inmates except for those situations in housing units where they 
could recreate together. Id.).  
71  Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2391 (2005) (citing class of 
current and former OSP inmates brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against various Ohio prison officials alleging that Ohio’s Old Policy 
violated due process); For a discussion on the selection procedures for 
OSP placement see infra notes 27-50 and accompanying text (detailing 
OSP placement under New Policy); See also 42 U.S.C. §1983: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
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what process an inmate must be afforded under the Due 
Process Clause when he is considered for placement at 
OSP.72  The Court concluded that inmates have a protected 
liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP.  The 
                                                                                                     
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. Id. 
 See also U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV §1, which states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Untied 
States and of the State wherein they reside.  No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
72 Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2386-87 After an eight-day trial, the 
District Court found that (1) based on the Supreme Court decision in 
Sandin v. Conner, the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding 
assignment to OSP and (2) Ohio denied the inmates due process by failing 
to give inmates adequate notice regarding the basis for their incarceration 
at OSP and by failing to provide inmates sufficient opportunity to 
understand the reasoning and evidence for their retention at OSP.  The 
Court further found that although Ohio's New Policy provided more 
procedural safeguards than its Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate 
to meet procedural due process requirements.  The District Court ordered 
extensive substantive and procedural modifications to the policy in an 
attempt to narrow the grounds that Ohio could consider in recommending 
OSP placement.  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court's conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest in 
avoiding placement at OSP.  The Court also affirmed the District Court's 
procedural modifications in their entirety, but set aside the District Court's 
far-reaching substantive modifications, holding the modifications 
“exceeded the scope of the District Court’s authority.” Id. 
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procedures set forth in the New Policy are sufficient to satisfy 
the Constitution’s requirements.73   
 
A. Existence of a Liberty Interest 
 
In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court considered due 
process protections of prisoners’ claiming liberty deprivation 
under the Due Process Clause.74 The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against 
deprivations of life, liberty, and property.75  Those who seek 
to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment must establish that one 
of the protected interests is at stake.76  A liberty interest can 
                                                 
73  See id. at 2398 (holding that Court of Appeals was correct to find 
inmates possessed a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP, 
however, lower court was incorrect to sustain procedural modifications); 
For an example of the history of prisoners and the Due Process Clause, 
see Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972) (where the Court 
addressed the question of whether due process required a hearing before a 
parolee's status could be revoked properly.  In discussing for the first time 
the liberty interests of convicted prisoners under the new due process 
analysis, the Court noted that parolees have a liberty interest in remaining 
free from restraint while abiding lawfully by the terms of their parole, and 
that the Constitution required due process protection in such a situation.); 
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1975) (creating the “state-
created liberty interest doctrine,” for cases in which prisoners claimed a 
violation of a liberty interest without due process) (The Court held that 
prisoners deserved due process protection in situations where the state had 
created a specific entitlement through its statutes and regulations.  The 
court held that prisoners are deserving of due process sufficient to “insure 
that the state-created right [was] not arbitrarily abrogated.” Id.); See also  
Meachum v. Fano, 97 S.Ct. 191 (1976) (This case held that prison 
officials had absolute authority to make decisions concerning where to 
house convicted prisoners and when to transfer prisoners from prison to 
prison, as long as objective law did not grant prisoners rights limiting 
such official discretion and found that, unless a deprivation of liberty 
within prison could be tied to the Constitution itself, only the loss of a 
specific state-created liberty interest would entitle a prisoner to protection 
under the Due Process Clause.). 
74  See infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text. 
75  U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV 
§
 1. 
76  The “consideration of a due process claim goes through two steps. 
First, the Court asks whether a liberty or property interest exists with 
which the state has interfered.  Second, the Court determines whether the 
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be created within the Constitution itself, by reason of 
guarantees implicit in the word “liberty” or from an 
expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.77   
 
1. Sandin v. Conner 
 
The issue of whether the Due Process Clause requires 
prisons to establish formal procedures in its administration of 
discipline is not a new issue for the Supreme Court.78  In 
Sandin, the Court addressed the legal standards that courts 
apply in considering prisoner claims of liberty deprivation 
under the Due Process Clause.79  Specifically, Sandin 
required the Court to determine whether an inmate had been 
deprived of his due process rights when Hawaii prison 
officials selected the inmate for placement in solitary 
confinement for thirty days without a formal selection 
                                                                                                     
procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 
sufficient.” Austin v. Wilkinson, Case No. 4:01-CV-71 (ND Ohio, 
November 21, 2001). 
77  See, e.g., Wolff, 94 S.Ct. at 2963 (1974) (finding liberty interest in 
avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits). 
78  See infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text; See Meachum v. 
Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976) (history of prior Supreme Court holdings 
considering inmates’ liberty interests and due process) (finding there was 
no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause inherent in transfers 
from low to maximum-security prison because “confinement in any of the 
State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which 
the conviction has authorized the State to impose”). See also Kentucky 
Dept of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1989) (holding that no 
procedures need accompany suspension of visitation privileges); See also 
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). See also Wolff, 94 S. Ct. at 
2963 (holding that states may under certain circumstances create liberty 
interests which are protected by Due Process Clause, but these interests 
will “be limited to restraints on freedom which impose ‘atypical and 
significant hardship on inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison 
life’” and concluding that due process applies prior to revocation of good 
time credits.). See also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 370, 378-81 
(1987) (concluding that due process applies to denial of parole); See also 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461, 471-72 (1983) (finding that due process 
applies prior to administrative segregation).  
79  See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2293 (involving a procedural due process 
protection claim before placement in segregated confinement for thirty 
days, imposed as discipline for disruptive behavior). 
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procedure.80  The Court altered its methodology for 
determining when such formal procedures are required and 
found the inmate’s due process rights had not been violated.81  
Under the Court’s new methodology, prison officials acting 
in violation of specific regulations often gives rise to a liberty 
interest worthy of procedural due process protection.82   
Prior to Sandin, courts relied heavily on state statutes and 
prison rules in cases involving questions of prisoner’s 
procedural due process rights.83  According to Sandin, the 
                                                 
80  Id. at 2301-02 (the Court held that the prisoner's “discipline in 
segregated confinement [for thirty days] did not present the type of 
atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create 
a liberty interest.”  The segregated confinement did not “present a 
dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence,” 
as inmates in the general population experienced “significant amounts of 
‘lockdown time’” and the severity of confinement in disciplinary 
segregation was not excessive. Id. at 2301.);  See id. (holding that states 
may under certain circumstances create liberty interests that are protected 
by the Due Process Clause.) 
81  See id. at 2300; See also Scott F. Weisman, Sandin v. Conner: 
Lowering the Boom on the Procedural Rights or Prisoners, 46 AM. U.L. 
REV. 897, 909 (citing Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 
454, 462-63 (1989) (claiming that before Sandin, Supreme Court 
recognized state-created liberty interests when a statute or prison 
regulation contained: (1) substantive predicates or specific criteria to 
guide prison officials in deciding whether to alter conditions or length of 
inmates’ confinement; and (2) mandatory language, earmarked with 
words such as “shall” or “must,” permitting adverse change in 
confinement only if substantive predicates were met)). 
82 Michael Z. Goldman, Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison 
Confinement: Ten Years of Confusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation, 
45 B.C. L. REV 423, 425 (2004) (noting that for twenty years prior to 
Sandin, Supreme Court recognized that prisoners possessed liberty 
interests protected by Due Process Clause if prisoners could point to 
specific state or federally created right that prison officials had violated). 
83  See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2408 (2005) (citing 
Sandin, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (noting earlier Supreme Court cases had 
employed methodologies for identifying state-created liberty interests that 
emphasized “the language of a particular [prison] regulation” instead of 
“nature of the deprivation” Id.)); See also Weisman, supra note 81, at 909 
(citing Kentucky Dept of Corr., 490 U.S. at 462-63 (explaining that before 
Sandin Supreme Court recognized state-created liberty interests when a 
statute or prison regulation contained: (1) substantive predicates or 
specific criteria to guide prison officials in deciding whether to alter 
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proper inquiry should focus on whether a violation caused an 
“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 84  The Sandin Court 
shifted due process analysis to the severity of the proposed 
punishment when it held that formal procedures are required 
for those punishments that pose an “atypical and significant 
hardship” on the inmate.85  In determining whether the 
conditions of the inmate’s confinement constitute an 
“atypical and significant hardship,” courts must consider the 
nature of the restrictive conditions themselves “in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”86  Under the new 
                                                                                                     
conditions or length of inmate's confinement and (2) mandatory language, 
earmarked with words such as “shall” or “must,” permitting an adverse 
change in confinement only if substantive predicates were met)). 
84 Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (holding prior analysis focused on 
finding “negative implications from mandatory language in prisoner 
regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause” in attempts to return to due process 
principles established in Wolff and Meachum. Id.).  
85  See id. at 2301-02 (illustrating that after Sandin, courts inquired 
into “existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding 
restrictive conditions of confinement is not found in regulation language 
regarding those conditions but in nature of those conditions themselves in 
relation to ordinary incidents of prison life” Id.);  See also Julia M. 
Glencer, An ‘Atypical and Significant’ Barrier to Prisoners’ Procedural 
Due Process Claims Based on State-Created Liberty Interests, 100 DICK. 
L. REV. 861, 894  (disapproving of prior methodologies because of two 
undesirable effects resulting from its application). The prior methodology 
was resulting in two undesirable effects from its application:   
First, states were reluctant to codify guidelines for prison 
management for fear of creating liberty interests that invited 
litigation.  Supreme Court precedent under Hewitt actually 
militated against written standards, even though guidelines 
were sorely needed to moderate prison officials' unbridled 
discretion.  Second, the use of the old methodology drew 
federal courts into daily prison administration.  The 
traditional leeway given prison officials in maintaining order 
inside the country's prisons had been usurped by the courts. 
Id. 
86  See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2296 (describing how states may create 
liberty interests, when “atypical and significant hardship [would be borne 
by] the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” Id.). 
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methodology, the Court found thirty days of solitary 
confinement was not an “atypical and significant hardship.”87 
In Wilkinson, the Court applied the Sandin methodology 
to determine whether the harsh conditions within OSP 
imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” that created a 
liberty interest in avoiding placement to OSP.88  The Court 
noted, despite the severe limitations on human interaction, 
OSP’s conditions would likely be similar to most solitary 
confinement facilities and not be an “atypical or significant 
hardship.”89   
The Court found, however, there were two additional 
restrictions placed on OSP inmates, which increased the 
amount of hardship beyond the normal course of prison 
confinement.90  First, the duration of placement at OSP was 
indefinite and only reviewed annually.91  Second, placement 
                                                 
87  See id. at 2300 (noting court record showed that solitary 
punishment, was similar to conditions imposed upon inmates in 
administrative segregation and protective custody and that inmates in 
general populations experienced “significant amounts of ‘lockdown 
time’” and degree of confinement in disciplinary segregation was not 
excessive). 
88  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2394 (reasoning that Sandin standard 
required courts “to determine if assignment to OSP ‘imposes atypical and 
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life’” Id.); To determine whether the inmate has endured an 
atypical and significant hardship, courts must compare the conditions of 
confinement in the Supermax facility to those an inmate would ordinarily 
expect in prison.  See Maximilienne Bishop, Supermax Prisons: 
Increasing Security or Permitting Persecution?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 461. 
(2005) (explaining that in determining if liberty interests exist, courts 
must find that conditions constitute “atypical and significant hardship” on 
inmates).   
89  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2394 (noting that for OSP inmates, 
almost all human contact is prohibited, even cell to cell conversation; cell 
lights are on for 24 hours and only one hour of exercise in small indoor 
rooms is permitted per day).    
90  Id. (holding that OSP conditions would likely apply to most 
solitary confinement facilities, except for two added components:  
duration and that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for 
parole consideration). 
91  See id. at 2394-2395 (noting that unlike 30-day placement at issue 
in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after OSP’s initial 30-day 
review, is reviewed just annually). 
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in OSP disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole 
consideration.92  The Court acknowledged the disagreement 
among the Courts of Appeals as to the proper baseline to 
define an “atypical or significant hardship.”93  The Wilkinson 
Court opted not to resolve the disagreement as the Court 
found, under any plausible baseline, the OSP’s harsh 
conditions imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” 
within the correctional context which creates a liberty interest 
in avoiding placement to OSP.94 
 
B. How Much Process is Due? The Mathews v. 
Eldridge Test 
 
Having found the existence of a liberty interest, the 
Wilkinson Court turned to the question of what due process is 
due to an inmate that Ohio seeks to place in OSP.95  The 
Court noted that because the proper procedural protections 
depend on the nature of the particular situation, the 
requirements of due process are flexible.96  In evaluating the 
sufficiency of Ohio’s selection procedure, the Court 
                                                 
92 See id. at 2395 (finding that OSP placement disqualifies an 
otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration is unlike restrictions in 
Sandin.) 
93  See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; See also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 
F.3d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining this divergence indicates 
difficulties in locating appropriate baselines, however, need not be 
resolved as assignment to OSP imposes an atypical and significant 
hardship under any plausible baseline). 
94  See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (noting that despite Ohio's interest 
in decreasing dangerous high-risk inmates on both prison officials and 
other prisoners, under Sandin‘s standard, OSP’s harsh conditions impose 
atypical and significant hardships within correctional context that creates 
inmate liberty interest in avoiding placement to OSP.) 
95  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (explicating that since inmate 
liberty interest in avoiding OSP has been established, inquiry now turns 
Sic.  to question of what process is due inmates whom Ohio seeks to place 
in OSP). 
96 See id.  (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972)) 
(declining to establish rigid rules and instead embraced a flexible 
framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures). 
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continued the framework established in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.97 
 
1.  Mathews v. Eldridge 
 
In Mathews, the Supreme Court created a three prong 
balancing test to determine the proper amount of due process 
required under a particular set of facts and circumstances.98  
In determining that no evidentiary hearing is required before 
termination of disability benefits and that present 
administrative procedures fully satisfy due process 
guarantees, the Court expounded the three due process 
factors.99 The Court’s balancing test required the 
consideration of: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.100 
                                                 
97  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
98  Id. (determining whether Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment 
provides opportunities for evidentiary hearings to Social Security 
disability benefit recipient prior to termination of his benefits). 
99  Id. at 336 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)) (holding unsatisfied 
worker must provide medical assessments of physical or mental 
conditions stating that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment” Id.); See also Matthew Q. Ammon, Constitutional Law—
Procedural Due Process—Employment—Suspension—State Employees, 
36 DUQ. L. REV. 951, 957 (1998) (explaining Court found small risk of 
wrongful deprivation under facts while government’s interest was great in 
avoiding increased costs associated with hearings prior to termination of 
benefits and required payments while decisions are pending).  
100  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (addressing nature and extent of 
hearing procedures that are required to protect against erroneous or 
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In applying the three factors set forth in Mathews, the 
Supreme Court found Ohio’s New Policy provides a 
sufficient level of process for Ohio inmates being considered 
for placement in OSP.101  Under the first Mathews factor, the 
Court considered the significance of the Ohio inmate’s 
interest in avoiding improper placement at OSP.102  The 
Court noted that lawfully confined prisoners have their 
liberties curtailed, so the proper amount of procedural 
protections afforded to inmates are more limited than in cases 
where the right to be free from total confinement is at 
stake.103  Here, the inmate’s private liberty interest is at stake 
                                                                                                     
arbitrary deprivation of any property interest and “recognizing that at 
some point the costs of additional procedural safeguards may outweigh 
their benefits” Id.); See also Matthew J. Macario, Recent Decisions: 
Constitutional Law—Punitive Damage Awards and Procedural Due 
Process in Products Liability Cases, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 409, 414 (1995) 
(stating Mathews test requires “utilitarian balancing of the interests at 
stake: When the private interest is not outweighed by the government’s 
interest in preserving its procedural framework, procedural due process is 
satisfied” Id.); See also Bradley J. Wyatt, Even Aliens Are Entitled to Due 
Process: Extending Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing to Board of 
Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
606 (2004) (explaining Mathews’ Court created a balancing test to 
determine whether administrative procedures conform to procedural due 
process laws. In order to determine what process is due, the Court called 
for “a balancing of private interests, the probable value of additional safe 
guards, and the government interest, including the cost of the procedure.” 
Id.). 
101 See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (Supreme Court rejected the 
District Court’s procedural modifications by finding the court improperly 
found that Sandin altered the first Mathews factor and increased the 
amount of due process protection required under the balancing test.  
Because the Sandin Court found there was no liberty interest at stake, 
“Sandin had no occasion to consider whether the private interest was 
weighty vis-à-vis the remaining Mathews factors.” Id.).  
102  See generally id.; see also David Kauffman, Procedures for 
Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 153, 165 (1982) (detailing that “to estimate the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation, courts must make intuitive judgments as to 
whether the procedures at issue will yield an accurate result” Id.). 
103  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103 (1975)); See also Wolff v. McDonald, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1975) 
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and must be considered within the norms of the prison system 
and its infringement on the liberty of inmates.104   
The second factor focuses on the “fairness and reliability” 
of the existing procedures, and the “probable value, if any, of 
additional procedural safeguards.”105 Supreme Court 
procedural due process cases have consistently observed that 
notice and a fair opportunity for rebuttal are among the most 
important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding 
erroneous deprivations.106  The Mathews Court noted that 
Ohio’s New Policy provides for an inmate to receive both 
procedural requirements before being placed in OSP.107  In 
addition to these safeguards, the Court noted Ohio’s New 
Policy provided further requirements that reduced the 
possibility of an erroneous OSP placement.108  The New 
Policy: (1) allows inmates the opportunity to be heard at the 
Classification Committee stage and affords inmates the right 
to submit objections prior to the final level of review; (2) 
allows a subsequent reviewer to overturn a recommendation 
for placing an inmate in OSP and mandates the termination of 
the selection process if any one reviewer does not 
                                                                                                     
(noting that prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty 
curtailed by definition, so procedural protections to which they are 
entitled are more limited than in cases where questioned right is to be free 
from confinement completely). 
104  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (holding “the private interest at 
stake here, while more than minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless, 
within the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of 
liberties” Id.). 
105  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976). 
106  See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); See also Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 
92 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1864) 
(explicating that “for more than a century the central meaning of 
procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be 
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that 
right they must first be notified’” Id.). 
107  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396 (noting Ohio’s New Policy 
required officials to provide brief summaries of factual basis for inmate’s 
review and allows prisoners rebuttal opportunity implemented to prevent 
placement of inmates in OSP by mistake or bias). 
108   Id. 
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recommend OSP placement; (3) requires that a final 
recommendation for placement in OSP be accompanied by a 
short statement of the reasons from the decision maker and 
(4) provides a review of the prisoner’s placement “within 
thirty days of the inmate's initial assignment to OSP.”109 
The final, and most influential, Mathews factor addresses 
the State’s interest.110  With Ohio’s prison population 
reaching nearly 44,000 inmates, “the State’s first obligation 
must be to ensure the safety of the guards and the prison 
personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves.”111  The 
State’s interest in maintaining prison security is threatened by 
the persistence of prison gangs and violence.112  Prison gangs 
routinely engage in acts of violence as a means of gang 
discipline and control, as membership rituals, or as 
punishment against inmates who have testified against the 
gang.113 
                                                 
109 Id. (explaining that “this requirement guards against arbitrary 
decision making while also providing the inmate a basis for objection 
before the next decision maker or in a subsequent classification review” 
and “serves as a guide for future behavior” and finding that subsequent 
reviewer’s ability to overturn recommendations for placing inmates in 
OSP “avoids one of problems apparently present under the Old Policy, 
where, even if two levels of reviewers recommended against placement, a 
later reviewer could overturn their recommendation without explanation” 
Id.). 
110  Id. (finding that in “the context of prison management, and in the 
specific circumstances of this case, this interest is a dominant 
consideration” Id.). 
111  Id. (citing Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2002)); 
See also id. at 2397(citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461, 473 (1983) 
(noting “the safety of the institution's guards and inmates is perhaps the 
most fundamental responsibility of the prison administration.” Hewitt, 
459 U.S. at 473). 
112  Id. at 2396 (noting gangs are “clandestine, organized, fueled by 
race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of 
disciplining their own members and their rivals” and “seek nothing less 
than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls” 
Id.). 
113  Id. at 2396-97(detailing that murder of inmates, guards, or one of 
their family members on the outside is common form of gang discipline 
and control, as well as condition for membership in some gangs; 
testifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite 
one's own death sentence; and prison gang members serving life 
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The State also has an interest in the efficient allocation of 
limited prison funding.114  The high cost of the State’s 
penitentiary system makes it difficult to fund more effective 
education and vocational assistance programs to improve the 
lives of the prisoners.115  The Supreme Court noted, in 
Wilkinson, that courts must give “substantial deference to 
prison management decisions before mandating additional 
expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards”116 when 
correctional officials have determined that an inmate has been 
involved in disruptive behavior.117  In light of these economic 
constraints, the Court rejected the District Court’s 
recommendation that inmates should be allowed to call 
witnesses at their OSP selection hearings.118 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that after balancing 
the three Mathews factors, Ohio’s New Policy in selecting 
                                                                                                     
sentences, without possibility of parole, have diminished deterrent 
effects); See also United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 
1995) (involving inmate gang members’ being required to kill someone in 
prison before the inmate could become member of Mexican Mafia prison 
gang); See also United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1341 (7th Cir. 
1984) (explaining that to qualify for membership in Aryan Brotherhood 
prison gang you must “make bones”— or kill somebody and detailing that 
Aryan Brotherhood and Mexican Mafia are allied, among other things in 
their hostility to black inmates, who have their own gangs.). 
114  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397; See also Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction, The Institutions, http://www.drc.state.oh.us 
/Public/osp.htm (outlining OSP’s annual operating budget of 
$28,595,868).  
115 See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (noting cost of keeping single 
prisoner in Ohio's ordinary maximum-security prisons is $34,167 per 
year, while cost to maintain each inmate at OSP is $49,007 per year). 
116 Id. at 2388 
117 Id. (holding that State's interest must be considered in light of 
State’s limited resources and if Ohio were to allow inmates “to call 
witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing before 
ordering transfer to OSP, both the State's immediate objective of 
controlling the prisoner and its greater objective of controlling the prison 
could be defeated” Id.). 
118  Id. at 2397 (explaining that altering New Policy to permit calling 
witnesses is both economically infeasible and “the danger to witnesses, 
and the difficulty in obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value 
of an adversary-type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious costs” 
Id.). 
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inmates for OSP provided enough safeguards to insure 
against arbitrary assignment.119  The Court noted that when 
the inquiry “draws more on the experience of prison 
administrators, and where the State’s interest implicates the 
safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal, 
non-adversary procedures”120 applied provide the proper 
methodology.121  Ohio’s New Policy provides “informal, 
non-adversary procedures” sufficient to satisfy the due 
process clause under the Mathews test and no further 
procedural modifications were necessary.122 
 
IV.       CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WILKINSON OPINION 
 
In balancing the Mathews factors in Wilkinson, the Court 
found that inmates’ private interests in avoiding placement 
into OSP did not outweigh the government's interest in 
maintaining an orderly and safe penitentiary system.123  
                                                 
119  Id. at 2398 (holding balance of the Mathews factors reveals that 
Ohio's New Policy is adequate to safeguard inmate liberty interests in not 
being assigned to OSP); See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593 
(1972) (finding Ohio is not attempting to remove inmates from free 
society for specific parole violation or to revoke good time credits for 
specific, serious misbehavior); See also Wolff v. McDonald, 94 S. Ct. 
2963 (1975) (involving more formal, adversary-type procedures as 
useful). 
120 Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (discussing Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)). 
121 See, e.g., Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1 (holding that the amount of 
process due for inmates being considered for release on parole includes 
opportunity to be heard and notice of any adverse decision); See also 
Hewit v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (finding amount of process due for 
inmates being considered for transfer to administrative segregation 
includes some notice of charges and opportunity to be heard). 
122 See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (rejecting District Court and 
Court of Appeals order to alter New Policy). 
123  See generally id. (holding that in applying Mathews three factors, 
Ohio's New Policy demonstrates it provides sufficient level of process); 
for a contrary balance of the Mathews factors, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 
v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985) (finding government’s interest in 
limiting administrative burdens and delays, did not outweigh private 
interests even though government has interest in avoiding disruptions in 
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Inmates’ interests were considered under the first factor of 
the Mathews test, which weighs the “private interest that will 
be affected by the official action.” 124  The Court’s opinion, 
however, focuses on the second and third Mathews’ factors, 
hardly discussing the inmates’ individual interests, thereby 
tipping the balance in favor of Ohio.125  Traditionally, when 
determining the weight of the threatened individual interest, 
courts consider four major criteria: the severity of the 
deprivation, the duration of deprivation, the reversibility of 
the deprivation, and the access of claimants to private 
alternatives.126  In the Wilkinson due process analysis under 
the Mathews test, the Court did not discuss any of these 
criteria.127   
Additionally, in determining the weight of an inmate’s 
interest in avoiding OSP selection, the Court chose not to 
                                                                                                     
its workplace, as it is better to keep skilled employees than to train new 
replacements). 
124  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 335, 335 (1976); see also 
Macario, supra note 100, at 414 and accompanying text (stating Mathews 
test requires “utilitarian balancing of the interests at stake: When the 
private interest is not outweighed by the government's interest in 
preserving its procedural framework, procedural due process is satisfied” 
Id.).  
125  See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2384. 
126  For a discussion on the severity of the property deprivation see 
Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3 (1978); For a discussion 
on the duration of the deprivation see Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12 
(1979) (describing that “duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation 
of a property interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of 
official action on the private interest involved”); see also North Ga. 
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); see also 
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975); For a discussion on 
reversibility of deprivation, see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340 (1976) 
(explicating that availability of full retroactive relief for recipient whose 
social security benefits were wrongfully terminated greatly influenced 
Court's decision); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) 
(detailing that it is impossible to recompense driver for lost time during 
which driver could not drive and for resulting burdens on performance of 
his duties due to improperly revoked license); for a discussion on the 
access of claimants to private alternatives see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342 
(1976) (terminating disability recipient has the “possibility of access” to 
private resources or welfare assistance.). 
127  See generally Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct at 2394. 
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discuss the physical and mental consequences of placement 
into OSP.128  A number of psychological studies have been 
conducted which indicate that the isolation and lack of 
activity within Supermax facilities leads to mental health 
problems with its inmates.129  By ignoring the potentially 
hazardous mental health effects of Supermax facilities, the 
Supreme Court chose to exclude a relevant component of the 
first Mathews factor.130   
Professional research indicates that inmates subjected to 
long-term solitary confinement have an increased risk of 
developing potentially serious psychiatric problems.131  The 
high rate of mental health problems in the general prison 
population is exacerbated by the extreme isolation of 
supermax inmates.132  As greater restrictions and social 
deprivations are placed on inmates, their levels of social 
                                                 
128  Id. 
129  For a history of inmate isolation studies see Hans Toch, The 
Future of Supermax Confinement, 81 PRISON J. 376, 376-88 (2001) 
(finding “early U.S. experiments with isolation in Pennsylvania and New 
York in the 1800s demonstrated the severe impact that isolation has on 
inmates’ psychological and physical health” resulting in “prison 
administrators quickly abandoned solitary confinement as a general 
correctional tool and used isolation as only a temporary form of 
punishment.” Id.). 
130 See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319; see also infra note 131 and 
accompanying text (outlining traditional Supreme Court considerations in 
determining proper weight of threatened individual interest).  
131  See Stanley Brodsky & Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates in Protective 
Custody: First Data on Emotional Effects, 1 FORENSIC REP. 267 (1988); 
see also Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary 
Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983); see also Stuart 
Grassian and Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in 
Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 49 (1986); see also Holly A. Miller, Reexamining 
Psychological Distress in the Current Conditions of Segregation, 1 J. 
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 39 (1994); see also Scott, G. and Paul 
Gendreau, Psychiatric Implications of Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum 
Security Prison, 14 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC. J. 337 (1969).  
132  See generally Paula M. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of 
Inmates and Probationers, U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 1999, available at http://www.ojp.usdog.gov/bjs/pub/ 
ascii/mhtip.txt.  
254          Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law        Vol. 2 
 
  
withdrawal and psychological problems dramatically 
increase.133   
The psychological effects on supermax inmates can 
manifest in varying mental disorders.134  Specifically, recent 
studies suggest that the added restrictions of inmate isolation 
and segregation result in depression, hostility, severe anger, 
sleep disturbances, physical symptoms, and anxiety among 
inmates.135 Isolation can produce emotional damage, declines 
in mental functioning, depersonalization, hallucinations, and 
delusions.136  Inmates in isolation also suffer from numerous 
physical symptoms, such as perceptual changes, difficulties 
in thinking, concentration and memory problems, and 
problems with impulse control.137  Interviews with inmates in 
high-security facilities have demonstrated similar findings.138  
                                                 
133 Imposing more restrictions without appropriate activity 
programming is detrimental to inmates’ health and rehabilitative 
prognoses. Potentially beneficial programming includes educational, 
recreational, and psychological services.  See Jesenia Pizarro and Vanja 
M.K. Stenius, Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current Practices, and 
Effects on Inmates, 84 PRISON J. 248, available at 
http://tpj.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/84/2/248 (claiming that “increasing 
inmates’ restrictions by limiting human contact, autonomy, goods, or 
services requires more intense activity programming to counteract the 
adverse effects of these restrictions” Id.). 
134  For a discussion on the various mental disorders found within 
Supermax inmates, see Lynd, supra note 25. 
135  See Pizarro, supra note 131 (citing Brodsky, supra note 129; also 
citing Miller, supra note 129) (noting that although “types of restrictions 
and outcomes measured vary across studies, the general consensus is that 
increasing the level of restrictions increases the risk for psychological and 
emotional problems.” Id.) 
136  See generally Brodsky, supra note 129; see also Grassian, supra 
note 129.  See also Miller, supra note 129.  See also Scott, supra note 
129. 
137  See generally Brodsky, supra note 129.  See also Grassian, supra 
note 129; see also Grassian & Friedman, supra note 129.  See also Miller, 
supra note 129. 
138  These inferences about the impact of these facilities on inmates’ 
mental and physical health are based primarily on research examining the 
effects of temporary solitary confinement or administrative segregation 
within regular prisons.  The differences in the scope of restrictions and 
deprivations, as well as the duration of the isolation, have the potential of 
increasing the adverse effects.  Clearly, spending a specified number of 
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In particular, one study found that women living in a high-
security unit experienced claustrophobia, chronic rage 
reaction, depression, hallucinatory symptoms, defensive 
psychological withdrawal and apathy.139 
Although neglected by the Court in Wilkinson, the 
potentially hazardous mental health effect of Supermax 
facilities is a relevant component of the first Mathews 
factor.140  Under the first Mathews factor, the inmate’s 
interest in avoiding placement at OSP—the inmates’ interest 
in avoiding an environment that is potentially physically 
dangerous—should be considered.141  Although it is true that 
lawfully confined prisoners have curtailed liberties and less 
procedural protections, evidence that supermax inmates 
suffer from increased mental problems strengthens the 
argument that further procedural safeguards are necessary.142   
As stated in Wilkinson, an inmate’s private liberty interest 
is at stake and must be considered within the norms of the 
prison system and its infringement on the liberty of 
inmates.143  Research indicates greater health problems are 
placed on supermax inmates as compared to those of normal 
                                                                                                     
days in isolation is quite different from serving the remainder of one’s 
sentence, possibly years, in a Supermax facility. Similarly, spending 23 
hours a day in isolation with no activities is not comparable to spending 
23 hours a day in isolation with meaningful activities.  See Pizarro, supra 
note 131. 
139 See also Grassian, supra note 129 (attributing these problems to 
factors such as “depersonalization, the denial of individuality, the denial 
of personal initiative, and humiliation” Id.). 
140  See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).   See 
also supra note 129 and accompanying text (outlining traditional Supreme 
Court considerations in determining proper weight of threatened 
individual interest).  
141  For a discussion on the first Mathews factors see David Kauffman, 
Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1982) (detailing that “to estimate the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation, courts must make intuitive judgments as 
to whether the procedures at issue will yield an accurate result” Id.). 
142  See id.  
143  Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2395 (2005) (holding that 
“the private interest at stake here, while more than minimal, must be 
evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison system and its 
attendant curtailment of liberties” Id.). 
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prison inmates.144  Due to the possibility that an OSP inmate 
will become mentally unhealthy, those pending placement 
have a greater liberty interest in avoiding OSP placement 
than placement in a standard prison.145   
From the Court’s unanimous decision in Wilkinson, it is 
clear that the severe conditions and adverse effects on OSP 
inmates’ do not outweigh Ohio’s interest in maintaining an 
orderly and safe penitentiary system.146  It is not clear 
whether more due process would be owed to inmates under 
the Mathews test if the negative health effects of OSP inmates 
were considered.147  If the Court had considered the adverse 
mental effects of OSP in its application of the Mathews 
balancing test, perhaps it would have been less inclined to 
find that the “fairness and reliability” of the existing 
procedure provided sufficient procedural safeguards.148  
 
V.        WILKINSON DECISION’S NATIONAL IMPACT 
 
Wilkinson had an impact on Ohio’s New Policy for OSP 
inmate selection because it can now continue to operate under 
its current procedures.149  However, the larger, more 
important, impact of the Court’s decision is Ohio’s New 
Policy will be used as a guide for states to follow regarding 
their Supermax prisons.150 
The positive impact of the Wilkinson ruling will be the 
implementation of constitutionally permissible selection 
procedures for Supermax prisons that will decrease the 
number of wrongful and arbitrary inmate placements.151  
Additionally, the use of Supermax prisons will facilitate the 
penal systems obligation to ensure the safety of guards, 
                                                 
144  See id. at 2396. 
145  See id. 
146  See id. 
147  See id. 
148 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976); see also 
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396. 
149  See generally Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396.  
150  See generally id. 
151  See generally id.  
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prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners.152  Through 
the proper use of Supermax facilities, the threat of persistent 
prison gang violence will have a diminished effect on the 
state’s interest in maintaining prison security.153   
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Wilkinson decision, 
rejecting the due process challenges of Supermax prisoners, it 
is likely that additional Supermax facilities will be 
constructed throughout the country.  As professional research 
indicates, inmates subjected to long-term solitary 
confinement have an increased risk of developing potentially 
serious psychiatric conditions.154  This may impede the 
prisoner rehabilitation process and lead to problems in society 
from mentally effected inmates released from Supermax 
prisons.155  Additionally, the Court attempted to narrow its 
holding by citing the specific procedural safeguards 
implemented in Ohio’s New Policy.156  However, because the 
Court was unanimous in its upholding of the New Policy, 
some states may choose to provide fewer procedural 
safeguards than the Ohio New Policy.157  At such an early 
stage, it remains to be seen how the Wilkinson holding will 
impact Supermax prisons, state’s prison selection procedures, 
and inmates.  But for now it remains clear: Terry Nichols, 
Theodore Kaczynski, Lee Boyd Malvo, John Allen 
Muhammed, and Eric Robert Rudolph will continue to call a 
supermax prison home for a very long time.158 
                                                 
152  See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461(1983) (discussing “the safety 
of the institution’s guards and inmates is perhaps the most fundamental 
responsibility of the prison administration” Id.). 
153 See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (noting gangs are disruptive, 
functioning as “clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and 
committed to fear and violence as a means of disciplining their own 
members and their rivals” and “seek nothing less than to control prison 
life and to extend their power outside prison walls” Id.).  
154  See sources cited supra note 129, and accompanying text. 
155 See supra note 136, and accompanying text (indicating that 
inmates subjected to long term solitary confinement have increased risk of 
developing potentially serious psychiatric problems). 
156  See generally Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396. 
157 See generally id. 
158 See generally Supermax Prisons and the Constitution, supra note 2.  
See also Riveland, supra note 1. 
